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Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) have an important role in ensuring public sector 
accountability; their main activities being managing the audit of public sector entities’ 
financial statements and assessing probity/compliance, providing advice to 
parliamentary committees, and undertaking performance audits. Standards issued by 
the International Organisation of SAIs encourage SAIs to recognise the value they 
deliver through their activities and to demonstrate that to citizens, Parliament and other 
stakeholders. The recognition of the need to be democratically accountable for 
efficiency and effectiveness is one aspect of public value, which is also concerned with 
the just use of authority (Moore, 2013).  
The purpose of this paper is to develop the components of a SAI’s public value and, 
through a comparative international study, to analyse how SAIs report on the public 
value they deliver. Analysing reporting against the model developed in this paper 
indicates that SAIs’ reporting prioritises critiques to increase public sector efficiency 
and effectiveness, rather than government policy. In addition, it finds SAIs generally 
fail to discuss any negative consequences of their work. SAIs are encouraged to develop 








Almost 200 countries around the world operate Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) 
These publicly-funded SAIs undertake financial statement audits for agencies and 
government as a whole, as well as compliance and performance audits (The World 
Bank, 2001). SAIs are ubiquitous, with the International Organization of Supreme 
Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) (2013) asserting that SAIs deliver public value through 
ensuring public sector accountability, and independently and objectively supporting 
reform. Thus, SAIs are challenged to report on to whom and how they deliver public 
value (Bringselius, 2014). The question of how SAIs demonstrate relevance is therefore 
worthy of further investigation.  
Public value is increasingly important from a practical and theoretical point of view 
(Bryson, Crosby, & Bloomberg, 2015), although it is widely recognised as a complex 
concept (Hartley, Alford, & Hughes, 2015; Moore, 2013). Building on the principle of 
democratic accountability to citizens collectively, Moore (2014) argues that public 
value is concerned with the utilitarian ideal of efficiency and effectiveness of public 
resources to achieve outcomes, as well as the deontological aims seeking the 
appropriate use of authority to ensure a just and fair society. Moore’s (2013, 2015)  
‘public value triangle’ includes three aspects of public value, being: (i) an entity’s 
strategy to deliver public value; (ii) its ability to attract legitimacy and support; and (iii) 
the operational feasibility of it delivering public value. Moore’s (1995, 2015) narrative 
examples of public value has been augmented by others, yet empirical research into 
public value is scarce (Hartley, Alford, Knies, & Douglas, 2016). Specifically, there are 
calls to further build public value theory through analysis of the processes that add 
value, and those that bring strategic change in the collective environment (Bryson, 
Sancino, Benington, & Sørensen, 2016; Geuijen, Moore, Cederquist, Ronning, & van 
Twist, 2016; Hartley et al., 2016). Further, although Moore (2013, 2015) develops a 
‘public value account’, the role of entities’ annual publications (annual report, annual 
plan, etc.) has not been explored. 
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This research responds to gaps in the literature (as further described below), by 
developing a framework to map public value (as called for by, for example, Hartley et 
al., 2016) within SAIs. The contributions are threefold. This framework considers 
public value as an organisation-wide issue and utilises SAIs’ accounting–related 
publications in reporting that value. This is in contrast to research that has analysed 
individual managers’ responses to public value (Moore, 1995, 2013). Secondly, 
applying a public value framework to SAIs provides insights into how they report on 
the impact of their statutory audits which invoke agency theory and are used in the 
public sector to enhance organisational control and manage public risk (Hay, Simpkins, 
& Cordery, 2016).1 SAIs are ‘watchdogs of public value’ (Moore & Gates, 1987), and 
therefore we argue that SAIs should lead by example. Thirdly, we undertake a 
comparative international analysis of public value which recognises the contestability 
of SAIs’ core strategies (including ‘ensuring public sector accountability’) (Moore & 
Gates, 1987). The international framework we utilise establishes a set of ‘best practices’ 
but it also recognises the necessity of public input to develop agreed concepts of public 
value.  
The paper first presents an analysis of public value, developing the model for the 
empirical research. The research method is discussed in section 3, followed by the 
results. The paper concludes with a discussion, limitations and opportunities for further 
research.  
2. Public Value 
Since the NPM2 reforms, the public sector has increased its focus on accountability, but 
also on: customers, performance measurement and management systems such as total 
quality management, cost improvements and pay-for-performance (Burgess & Ratto, 
2003; Moore, 1995; G. Scott, Bushnell, & Sallee, 1990). Thus, an emerging literature 
considers public value (Bryson et al., 2015). Public entities are expected by various 
stakeholders to meet a number of goals, including the effective and efficient delivery 
of social outcomes, fairness and justice (Moore, 1995; G. Scott et al., 1990). A rational 
management approach requires entities to report against specific targets linked to the 
                                                 
1  Talbot and Wiggan (2010) analysed the public value delivered by the UK National Audit Office’s 
Value for Money (VfM) (performance) audits. In contrast, we consider the range of audits undertaken 
by SAIs - both financial and performance audits. 
2  New Public Management.  
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objectives for which they are held accountable (Christensen, Lægreid, Roness, & 
Røvik, 2007) to show they are efficient and effective. Nevertheless, measurement 
difficulties have led to inadequate reporting of qualitative impacts and vague outcome 
measures that do not assist in discharging accountability (Kloot, 2009; Lee, 2008; 
Moore, 2013; Pallot, 2003).3 
To ascertain the value they deliver, public entities often measure customer (or 
stakeholder) satisfaction (G. Scott et al., 1990). Yet, such surveys may not adequately 
reflect issues of justice and fairness in society, such as whose utility is to be maximised, 
or the effect of public policy on those stakeholders (Moore, 1995, 2014). Instead, Moore 
(2013) argues for sustained and detailed discussions with citizens about what value is 
– highlighting that value is not merely represented by service quality (to individuals), 
but by performance against specific outcomes (affecting citizens in general). While 
citizens are essential to develop the constructs of public value, it is public managers 
who measure and ascertain the boundaries of public value (Bryson et al., 2015). Public 
agencies must also collaborate to deliver value (Bryson et al., 2016; Crosby, Hart, & 
Torfing, 2016; Geuijen et al., 2016). 
Bryson et al. (2015) note that definitions of public value (other than Moore’s) exist. For 
example, Bozeman (2007) argues against the neo-liberal values in NPM and focuses 
not only on citizens’ rights, but also citizens’ obligations to society, and principles 
which should drive government policy-making. He analyses success and failure in 
respect of policy-making (Bozeman, 2007). Alternatively, Meynhardt (2015, p. 147) 
notes public value may “be seen as a way to contextualize financial and non-financial 
performance within a larger picture of human values established in the public sphere 
and in society at large”. While this is similar to Moore, Meynhardt’s (2015, p.147) 
public value is assessed at the individual or project level, rather than for an organization 
overall. In contrast, this study focuses on the public value that organisations 
(specifically SAIs) deliver and report on, rather than assessing that reported by 
individuals.  
                                                 
3  Other tools, for example adding contestability or establishing a quasi-market, are NPM methods used 
to increase utilitarian values of efficiency in public value (Pallot, 2003), although they are not 
necessarily extendable to meeting deontological aims for fairness and justice.  
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As noted above, Moore (1995, 2013) suggests public entities can build public value 
through a ‘strategic triangle’. Thus, public value is not delivered and reported on as a 
single concept, but as a combination of each of the triangle’s aspects so that learning 
and development occur to deliver public value (Moore, 2013). In this paper, we develop 
a framework of SAI reporting that considers each of these strategic points (see 
subsections below). To do this, we utilise literature and the International Standard for 
SAIs (ISSAI) 12: The Value and Benefits of Supreme Audit Institutions – making a 
difference to the lives of citizens (INTOSAI, 2013), which requires SAIs to 
“demonstrate their ongoing relevance to citizens, Parliament and other stakeholders”. 
As these stakeholders fund SAIs, we suggest this relevance is delivered by the extent 
to which SAIs report on the public value they deliver. 
2.1. A strategy to develop public value 
Two aspects of public value are analysed: the need for public sector accountability and 
the role of SAIs in independently and objectively supporting reform (INTOSAI, 2013). 
Moore (2013, p. 86) notes that, in addition to elected representation “… the threat of 
audits create[s] a powerful, continuous current of accountability that runs through 
public agencies”.4 It is axiomatic that public sector accountability is a key outcome of 
an SAI’s public value. Indeed, the Open Budget Survey 2015 (International Budget 
Partnership, 2015 (IBP)) states that countries with strong formal oversight systems (i.e. 
SAIs), budget transparency and public participation, will have efficient, effective and 
accountable budget systems. “Audits are a vital part of the checks and balances on the 
governmental budgetary process”, preventing fraud and waste, and checking probity 
and legality (Friedberg & Lutrin, 2005, p. 4). 
Operationally, an independent SAI’s role “is to scrutinize the use of public funds, 
diagnose potential problems, and propose solutions” (IBP, 2015, p. 51). Such public 
value was confirmed in a Mexican citizen survey, as 77% of respondents agreed it was 
important for public institutions to be held accountable and act with transparency,5 more 
than two-thirds stated the SAI’s recommendations had helped to improve government 
                                                 
4  Yet, he also notes that “the daily swirl of democratic politics is both powerful and problematic” 
leading to demands from interest groups, citizens and the media (Moore, 2013, p. 88).  
5  Further, 83% of specialists (MPs, auditees and the media) were more emphatic agreeing 
accountability was “very important”. 
6 
 
processes, and 75% agreed that the SAI collaborated in the fight against corruption 
(González de Aragŏn, 2009). 
The vast majority of countries use SAIs for audit (with a small minority using internal 
auditors only) (OECD, 2000). Confirmation of the value of these checks can be seen in 
various US State legislatures requiring performance audits, including in Ohio where the 
citizens voted to apply a percentage of State Sales tax to funding such audits (Raaum 
& Campbell, 2006; Schultz & Brown, 2003). However, even though Blume and Voigt 
(2011) argue that effective SAIs should be able to reduce corruption compared to 
countries where SAIs are not effective, this was not borne out in their study utilising 
the Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International. It showed that the 
structure of the SAI (whether it uses the Napoleonic or court model) was the only 
measure that had significant explanatory power (Blume & Voigt, 2011).6 Nevertheless, 
when SAIs report on corruption it can be useful. For example, Bangladesh’s SAI has a 
role in assuring foreign aid and debt providers as to the efficacy of government accounts 
(Chowdhury, Innes, & Kouhy, 2005). 
It is difficult to find an objective measure of how SAIs increase public sector 
accountability, with Wilkins (1995, p. 429) suggesting surrogate measures such as 
rating by the auditee and “other relevant third-party observers of the audit offices’ 
contribution to public sector accountability”. SAIs must assist Parliamentary oversight 
committees to take appropriate action through high quality reporting and by building 
their scrutinising capacity (INTOSAI, 2013; Santiso, 2015).  
Under agency theory, audit recommendations/reports are one way to ensure public 
sector accountability. In Norway, Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnson (2015) found that 
performance audit recommendations were more likely to be positively responded to, if 
they are used as: (i) Parliamentary measures of auditees, (ii) tools to hold Ministers 
accountable to Parliament,7 and (iii) methods to improve organisational systems by 
auditees who believe them to be useful. Vanlandingham (2011) also found in the US 
that, when States have legislative requirements for evaluators and auditors to include 
recommendations in reports, auditees are more likely to implement them (than in those 
                                                 
6  Many of the measures used by Blume and Voigt (2011) such as tax rates and economic growth are 
influenced by many other factors as well as auditing. Further research using this approach is likely to 
be worthwhile.  
7  Both of these also occur in Israel (Alon, 2007; Milgrom & Schwartz, 2008). 
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States where no such legislation exists).8 Such accountability pressures are the largest 
drivers of change, which is an important demonstration of audit effectiveness 
(Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2015). 
SAIs must be “a credible source of independent and objective insight and guidance to 
support beneficial change in the public sector” (INTOSAI, 2013, p. 9). The most 
obvious examples of SAIs independently and objectively supporting reform are their 
performance audits. These aim to improve public sector management (Arthur, Rydland, 
& Amundsen, 2012), with SAIs commonly reporting on how many of their 
recommendations are accepted and acted upon (Gendron, Cooper, & Townley, 2001; 
INTOSAI, 2013, s. 3.6). Yet, Raudla et al. (2015) found in their Estonian study, that 
fewer than 10% of the auditees they surveyed considered performance audits as being 
engagements to hold them accountable for their actions. This could be due to a 
prioritisation of learning (a cultural-institutional perspective), rather than the strict 
accountability (a rational-instrumental perspective) (Christensen et al., 2007; Raudla et 
al., 2015; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2015). Indeed, SAIs’ relationships with 
auditees are frequently non-hierarchical and such recommendations require negotiation 
and compromise (C. Scott, 2003).9 Thus, Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnson (2015) 
explain that the Norwegian SAI’s performance audits are effective when the auditees 
have previously planned to make the recommended changes.10 This result is similar to 
the Dutch audits studied by Van Der Meer (1999). Nevertheless, Reichborn-Kjennerud 
and Johnson (2015) did not find support for the other cultural-institutional perspective 
factor, which was that auditees’ changes would be more dramatic depending on their 
agreement with the SAI’s recommendations. Yet, the Dutch study by De Vries reported 
in Van Loocke and Put (2011) found that changes were more likely to occur when 
auditors and auditees shared similar ideas, as also suggested by Vanlandingham (2011). 
                                                 
8  In 2009, the IBP found that 17 countries had no follow-up of recommendations, there was minimal 
follow-up in 20 countries and in 64 countries “the executive did not reveal what steps, if any, it had 
taken to address audit recommendations” (Ramkumar, 2009, p. 12). 
9  Etverk (2002) found that, due to the relative newness of performance auditing in that country, auditees 
were less familiar with SAI staff being ‘consultants’ (who would try to influence auditees by 
persuasion and discussion), and yet viewed these performance auditors more positively than 
traditional auditors who were perceived as ‘watchdogs’. 
10  Nonetheless, Raudla et al. (2015) suggest that when the auditees are aware of the challenges, they 
may have already put measures in place to correct them and that this may lead to no further changes 
being made (and thus reduce the value they place on the audit). This shows the complexity of 
measuring auditees’ perceptions of the change catalyst. 
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Tracking and publishing auditees’ implementations of SAIs’ recommendations 
therefore appears to be a measure of public value, but of the 29 SAIs for which Blume 
and Voigt (2011) had monitoring data, only 14 did so fully (11 had a partial tracking 
system/did not publish the data). However, examples from the UK and the Netherlands 
report ‘success rates’ for recommendations of between 67% within three years and 90-
100% overall, Australia has 91% and the US from 72-83% (Azuma, 2004; Lonsdale, 
2000).11 Yet, Raudla et al.’s (2015) Estonian study of auditees found only 21% agreed 
that a performance audit had led to their organisation adopting recommended changes, 
although 40% believed the performance audit had been useful.  
Morin (2001) argues that tracking the acceptance of recommendations is a simplistic 
measure of an audit’s success. Her multi-measure schema for performance audits 
includes 14 performance indicators and 11 factors based on a number of behavioural 
factors: the perceptions and reaction of the auditees, the impacts of the performance 
audit, and the extent of public debate arising from the public report. Morin (2008) finds 
the actions of the Public Accounts Committee and the media enhances the effect of the 
audit report, as did Etverk’s(2002) similar Estonian study. However, if popularity with 
auditees is a prime measure,  an SAI’s independence and accountability could be 
impaired (Noussi, 2012). 
The public auditor’s role is changing, as shown by Gendron et al.’s (2001) study of two 
decades of reports from the Office of the Auditor General of Alberta (OAGA). They 
find that the OAGA is now more likely (than in the past) to identify opportunities and 
propose solutions, to offer help to auditees, use dramatic examples for benchmarking 
(including drawing on international examples), and congratulate public servants and 
government (Gendron et al., 2001). These persuasive and influencing tactics show that 
public auditors have become ‘problem solvers’ (Gendron et al., 2001). Morin’s (2008) 
study of Quebec performance auditors also finds they are more likely to initiate change 
than not, although Morin’s (2014) survey of the impact of ten years of performance 
                                                 
11  Context will be important. For example, Hasan et al. (2013) describe a continuous improvement 
rating scheme in UK local authorities, which was rated under Audit Commission principles (by the 
Audit Commission or a private sector auditor) and led to many changes to meet “best practice”. 
However, Hatherly and Parker (1988) suggest that State Auditors-General had less success with 
Australian local authority audit recommendations. 
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audit in Canada (2001-2011) logged a mean score on a seven-point Likert scale of 3.5/7 
for “improvement of management”, which shows that change is not always positive.  
While auditee feedback is a measure of ‘client satisfaction’ and therefore part of the 
public value chain (Moore, 2013), a further measure of public value (beyond that to 
individuals) is for SAIs to contribute internationally (INTOSAI, 2013 s. 1.2, 7.3 & 7.5). 
Noussi’s (2012) study shows that high-performing SAIs with strong regional influence 
encourage other SAIs within the region to also implement reforms. Such a correlation 
suggests that the operational capacity and legitimacy and support within SAIs 
internationally will contribute to their ability to deliver public value.  
2.2. Legitimacy and Support 
SAIs can obtain legitimacy and support through being independent and trustworthy. To 
ensure external audits are credible and meaningful, independence from government as 
executive is critical (Barrett, 1996; Pollitt & Summa, 1997). Independence sustains a 
SAI when it has appropriate processes (i.e. freedom to choose what to audit and when, 
what to publish) (Grasso & Sharkansky, 2001; INTOSAI, 2013, ppl 1), and appropriate 
institutional arrangements (i.e. constitutional or legislative independence, a process for 
guaranteed funding, control over staff). In particular, using data from US state auditors, 
Schelker (2008) finds a positive correlation between the independence of auditor 
appointment (i.e. whether appointed by the legislature or elected by citizens), and the 
legislature’s audited financial statement quality. 
While Normanton (1966) states that auditors risk their independence by reviewing 
public policy, some argue that the principle is breached when SAIs undertake 
performance audits to evaluate the substance of programmes (Barzelay, 1997; Gendron 
et al., 2001; Grasso & Sharkansky, 2001). For example, Grasso and Sharkansky (2001), 
in their analysis of SAIs in the US and Israel, suggest growing pressure for SAIs to deal 
with politically sensitive issues (such as policy debates). From Germany, Czasche-
Meseke (1995) notes that it is a ‘fine line’, and unavoidable that sometimes the most 
carefully worded reports become caught in the political cross-fire.12 Indeed, Grasso and 
                                                 
12  Mulgan’s (2001, p. 25) analysis of Australian Auditors-General finds that “open clashes with 
government, however, are exceptions rather than the rule”, with confrontations limited mainly to 
matters of process and probity, as opposed to efficiency and effectiveness. Barrett (2002) notes it is 
a particular challenge and occurs when policy and implementation are difficult to separate. When his 
Office undertook performance audits on property sales and IT outsourcing, they elicited ‘significant 
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Sharkansky (2001, p. 1) argue that the purist conception of independence is obsolete 
and that objectivity is required instead, with it being “more realistic to urge diligence 
on the part of the supreme auditor”. This is evident in Jantz et al.’s (2015) analysis of 
performance reports from SAIs in Denmark (6 reports), Norway (6 reports) and 
Germany (7 reports), as only one criticised policy. SAIs’ unwillingness/ inability to 
critique policy reduces the likelihood that they will contribute to the deontological aims 
for fairness and justice, but instead prioritise utilitarian efficiency and effectiveness. 
SAIs need funding to operate. While some believe auditees should co-fund audits, many 
others argue SAI funding should be a core government appropriation (Lovell, 1996). If 
corrupt entities fund the auditor and no safeguards exist, audit quality may reduce due 
to pressure from the corrupt auditee, as found by Liu and Lin’s (2012) study of Chinese 
regional public sector audits. Even with State funding the same pressure applies, with 
Melo et al.’s (2009) Brazilian study finding that State Auditors with larger budgets were 
less likely to reject the (funding) legislature’s accounts.  
The SAI must be trusted if it is to retain legitimacy with and support from its auditees 
and other stakeholders (Talbot & Wiggan, 2010). This includes SAIs subjecting 
themselves to external scrutiny (INTOSAI, 2013 s. 8.5): such as commissioning an 
audit of their own reports (Wilkins, 1995), meeting quality councils’ accreditation 
requirements and subjecting themselves to independent review (Barrett, 1996). Yet, in 
many countries, the fear of impaired independence means SAIs are not statutorily 
required to be subjected to performance audit themselves (Clark, De Martinis, & 
Krambia-Kapardis, 2007; Funnell, 2015).  Under agency theory, such audits could be 
expected to increase confidence (and therefore trust) in those who cannot observe SAIs’ 
activity directly (Lovell, 1996; Streim, 1994). Further, James and John (2007) find in 
UK local government, that voters trusted the Audit Commission’s performance 
measurement more than politicians’ statements.13 In respect of the signalling 
                                                 
comment’ (Barrett, 2002). In her analysis of PPP audits in Australia, English (2007) distinguishes 
between system-based audits and substantive audits that critique the effectiveness of policy 
implementation. These latter are infrequently undertaken, with English (2007) noting they may not 
only impair the public auditor’s independence, but that also the auditor may find it difficult to access 
and/or report on confidential information relating to PPP contracts. This was also a concern in the 
UK when the NAO undertook performance audits of entities for which it did not audit the financial 
statements (Bowerman, Humphrey, & Owen, 2003). 
13  Yet, Melo et al. (2009) find that political competition is positively correlated to audit activity, 
suggesting that the more power a government has, the less audit and accountability discharge there 
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explanation for audit, Schelker’s (2008) study of US state auditors find that the more 
trustworthy the auditor, the less likely voters will elect a divided State government, 
believing the auditor will act as a control (which an otherwise active opposition would 
wield). 
Independent measures of this trust are lacking. The OECD (2013) uses data asking 
about specific aspects of government, but, as it does not focus on SAIs, it is difficult to 
measure whether trust in a SAI increases trust in government, or if cultural or political 
issues are stronger (OECD, 2013). Nevertheless, confidence in government is 
negatively correlated to the perception of government corruption (OECD, 2013) – an 
issue that SAIs can impact. To be trustworthy, SAIs also need exemplary operational 
capacity. 
2.3. Operating Capacity 
Moore’s (2013) third point of the strategic triangle is operating capacity. Operating 
capacity enables SAIs to deliver public value through high quality audits and 
responding appropriately to stakeholders. To ensure public sector accountability, an 
SAI must “be a model organisation through leading by example” (INTOSAI, 2013 ppl 
9) and, in effect, applying the same criteria to itself as it does to its auditees (Pollitt & 
Summa, 1997). This includes using legitimate audit standards, maintaining currency 
with audit techniques, complying with codes of ethics and having well-trained staff 
(INTOSAI, 2013 ppl 8-12). The European Court of Audit’s (ECA) work and reports 
have been criticised for not leading by example (Groenendijk, 2004) and, in a report on 
the IBS 2009 Open Budget Survey, Ramkumar (2009) finds that 27 out of 85 surveyed 
SAIs do not make audit reports publicly available, and six do not produce audit reports 
at all. This is despite ISSAI 12 (INTOSAI, 2013 s. 2.4, 3.2 & ppl 4) emphasising the 
need for SAIs to report audit results. 
SAIs are expected to be efficient (INTOSAI, 2013 s. 8.4), as shown in Melo et al.’s 
(2009) Brazilian study where efficiency is positively correlated to budget size and the 
presence of an independent career auditor (as opposed to a political crony). Further, 
Azuma (2004) notes that SAIs lead by example when they publish annual reports and 
annual plans, outline the outcomes they are working towards and outputs they have 
                                                 
is. However, because Brazil is a relatively new democracy, they also find that where there is low 
institutionalization, vote volatility is negatively related to audit activity.  
12 
 
produced. Talbot and Wiggan (2010) argue audits are more robust and valuable when 
they include new techniques such as service user surveys, focus groups and outside 
interest groups. For example, the Norwegian Parliament expects that country’s SAI’s 
performance audits to examine whether users are satisfied with government services 
(Arthur et al., 2012).  
As public value is assessed by citizens (Moore, 2013), another aspect of SAIs’ operating 
capacity is facilitating communication with citizens (INTOSAI, 2013 s. 6.4). This 
includes maximising media coverage, especially as, notes Dye (2009, p. 8), 
“Parliamentarians around the world, tend to be media junkies”. Nevertheless, Raudla et 
al. (2015, p. 14) suggests that media attention by itself does not lead to change in 
auditees, but that the media’s role becomes significant when it leads to “political debate 
and increased pressure from the opposition”. Further, while developing relationships 
with media could impair SAIs’ independence, Bringselius’ (2014) Swedish example 
shows that such relationships are necessary when there is no statutory requirement for 
Parliament to respond to audit reports. Hence, to measure public value, an SAI could 
measure the number of media releases, or the amount of media activity following audits 
(Bringselius, 2014; Lonsdale, 2000). Nevertheless, the Effective Institutions Platform 
(2014) reports SAIs generally do not evaluate the value stakeholders place on SAIs’ 
work. 
To deliver public value, SAIs should not wait for Parliament to take action, but report 
clearly and simply to all stakeholders, increasing stakeholders’ knowledge of 
accountability in the public sector and the SAI’s role in this (INTOSAI, 2013 ppl 4 & 
6). This may include, for example, publishing annual audit plans, undertaking surveys, 
maintaining a website, and using social media (Effective Institutions Platform, 2014; 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013) to develop a two-
way dialogue so that SAIs work on matters relevant to stakeholders. Stakeholders will 
not want to engage if the matters are irrelevant (Moore, 2013). Indeed, Brown and 
Craft’s (1980) US study find that the most effective performance audits are those that 
were on a subject of interest to the public and press, but also have material findings and 
were well-timed.  
Participatory mechanisms must also be representative (Effective Institutions Platform, 
2014), otherwise the SAI will receive poor signals about potential fraud or 
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inefficiencies (and, as noted by Bryson et al., 2015, may be biased). The IBS (2015) 
survey found that 31 SAIs do have mechanisms for public complaints which could feed 
through to audit topics. Yet, the IBS’s 2009 Open Budget Survey finds that: (i) 12 out 
of 46 countries did not have mechanisms for the public to recommend potential subjects 
for audit; and (ii) 44 surveyed SAIs did not include an executive summary in their audit 
reports, making audit reports hard to read (Ramkumar, 2009).  
With open data becoming more common and available, the concept of the “armchair 
auditor” suggests citizens may choose data (via various technological means) and 
analyse it as they see fit (O’Leary, 2015). These citizens may, for example, act as a 
control on government overspending if they communicate with the SAI or publish a 
report. Nevertheless, barriers include poor access to data, methodologies and analysing 
structures, missing data, and no clear community of “armchair auditors” which may 
lead to uninformed or malicious attacks on public sector entities (O’Leary, 2015).  
International literature suggests SAIs’ business-as-usual financial and performance 
audits can be measured as public value as shown in Table 1. This table also suggests 
unintended negative impacts could eventuate when entities are attempting to deliver 
public value (Moore, 2013).  
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Table 1: Measuring public value in SAIs – a summary 
Moore’s 
strategy 
ISSAI principle/s and 
description 






Ensuring public sector 
accountability 
Lack of corruption is measured by Corruption Perception Index (Blume & 
Voigt, 2011); 
Monetary savings arising from audits or the recommendations in them are 
also used (Blume & Voigt, 2011; Norton & Smith, 2008; Pollitt & 
Summa, 1997; Talbot & Wiggan, 2010); 
Ensure competency in Parliamentary oversight body (Azuma, 2004; 
Santiso, 2015). 
Use of performance audits for political 






Number of recommendations acted upon (Arthur et al., 2012; Gendron et 
al., 2001; Morin, 2001); 
Perception of auditees on usefulness of audit (Bowerman & Hawksworth, 
1999; Etverk, 2002; Morin, 2001, 2008, 2014; Vanlandingham, 2011). 
Perception of auditees on usefulness of 
audit may encourage SAI to reduce 
independence (Noussi, 2012); 
May lead to deterioration of 







Independence measured by assessing legislative and other arrangements 
(for example, Blume & Voigt, 2011; Robertson, 2013). No impact found.  
Melo et al. (2009) suggest a large budget 
could impair independence. 
Building trust 
Accreditation, reviews by PAC and other external bodies, providing 
summary measures (Barrett, 1996; James & John, 2007) 
May reduce diversity of Parliamentary 
Representation (at local level) (James & 





Lead by example 
Quality of staff and involvement at high levels of government (Gendron et 
al., 2001; Pollitt & Summa, 1997); 
Publishing an annual report (on-time), annual plan, strategic plan, low 
audit costs (Azuma, 2004; Gendron et al., 2001; Melo et al., 2009). 
Process-based auditing focused on short-
term may reduce achievement of policy 





Number of media releases/media activity following audits (Raudla et al., 
2015);  
Extent of public debate (Bringselius, 2014; Etverk, 2002; Morin, 2001) 
and input to audit activity; 
Number of public complaints and how they have been dealt with 
(Effective Institutions Platform, 2014). 
Relationship with media may impair 
independence; Input from stakeholders 
may not be representative (Effective 





The organisational framework developed in the prior section uses audit literature, 
Moore’s concept of public value and ISSAI 12 (INTOSAI, 2013). While disparate 
literature has analysed some aspects of this value, this research undertakes a 
comparative international study empirically analysing SAI reporting on the public value 
they deliver and through which they demonstrate their relevance. First, a list of all 
country members of INTOSAI was extracted14 and an internet search was undertaken 
of each SAI for documents using the term/s: “Public value”, “Value of audit”, 
“Benefits”, “Making a difference”, “ISSAI 12”, and “ISSAI”. Relevant documents 
were downloaded and content analysis was undertaken by coding against the normative 
model (NViVO was used to store the manual codings). Table 2 shows the results of the 
website search. 
Table 2: Countries with SAIs included in this research 
SAI categories No. 
Number of countries’ SAIs searched for 192 
Number of SAIs without a website or where the website was not available (49) 
Total websites searched 143 
Number of websites without a search facility (or needing an authorised log-
in to search) 
(35) 
Number of websites where information is not in English (35) 
Sub-total 73 
SAI websites without information on the search terms, where information 
was irrelevant to enquiry, or where reports sought were not in English 
(57) 
Total number of countries whose SAIs’ annual reports, strategic plans 
and annual plans were analysed.* 
16 
*These countries were: Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Jamaica, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey, 
the UK, and US. 
In terms of Azuma’s (2004) recommendation that SAIs produce a Strategic Plan, 
Annual Plan and Annual Report, the selected SAIs’ websites were further searched for 
                                                 
14  The full list can be found here: http://www.intosai.org/about-us/organisation/membership-list.html. 




these documents as the basis of the analysis. In some cases (e.g. Norway, Switzerland) 
the output in English was a summary of the documents in the official language. As we 
were limited to English, this limited our analysis. In addition to positive values, we also 
sought to analyse any challenges SAIs face and how they have responded to them (i.e. 
negative impacts). The presentation of the findings is segregated into each of Moore’s 
(2013) strategic points of value and a graphical representation as to the extent each of 
these SAIs report on the public value they deliver through these three main reports. 
4. Method 
4.1. Strategic Plan to Deliver Public Value 
As noted, the key measures of SAIs’ public value are ensuring public sector 
accountability and independently and objectively supporting reform. More commonly, 
SAIs publish a count of the number of reports tabled with Parliament (or the appropriate 
body), or report the number of completed audits in their annual report and their 
timeliness (e.g. Bangladesh, Canada, Hungary, UK), as well as the number of 
unqualified reports issued (e.g. New Zealand, Turkey). SAIs also comment that the 
quality of the sector’s underlying financial reports has improved (e.g. Estonia), showing 
the impact of audit.  
Audit reports are not the only means by which audit messages are communicated, with 
for example, the US GAO discussing in detail the number of Congressional committees 
it has reported to in its mission to reduce “fragmentation, overlap and duplication” in 
the public sector.15 Their annual report highlights recommendations it has made to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness. It also monitors the progress of agencies in 
addressing issues it has raised (as do, for example: Estonia, Iceland, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, Turkey).  
In the UK, the NAO is responsible for ensuring that government bodies are accountable 
for their economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Thus, the NAO reports that it saves 
taxpayers millions of pounds a year,16 possibly leading to lower government spending, 
lower tax rates and/or lower government deficits (Blume & Voigt, 2011; Pollitt & 
                                                 
15  2015 Annual Report: Additional opportunities to reduce fragmentation, overlap, and duplication and 
achieve other benefits. United States Government Accountability Office. Downloaded from 
http://www.gao.gov/about/paststratplanning.html 




Summa, 1997; Talbot & Wiggan, 2010).17 In respect of performance audits, the NAO 
values: (i) financial savings from efficiency improvements and waste minimisation; (ii) 
non-financial savings such as reduced waiting times or greater outputs; and (iii) 
qualitative aspects such as better planning or objective setting (Talbot & Wiggan, 
2010).18 The US’ GAO also measures savings15 and, while Bangladesh SAI’s annual 
report notes “the deterrent effect of audit is very significant that cannot be quantified”, 
it does list the dollar value of financial settlements following audits. In addition to 
strengthening government they “developed a networking relationship with other 
watchdog agencies”.19  
In addition, a number of SAIs obtain feedback from their auditees, including Audit 
Committee Chairs and Directors (e.g. of Crown Corporations) (e.g. Australia, Canada, 
Estonia, Ireland, UK). Feedback includes that independently gathered on the 
professionalism and knowledge of staff, and the value the SAI has added. The necessity 
for such feedback has been noted by Morin (2001, 2008, 2014), Etverk (2002), 
Bowerman and Hawksmith (1999) and Vanlandingham (2011).  
In highlighting the need to ensure taxpayers’ funds are well spent, and that public value 
is delivered, Jamaica’s SAI states “society needs to be aware of the negative impact 
arising from the lack of transparency and accountability in the public sector”.20 Barrett 
(1996) (then the Australian auditor-general) recommends that SAIs should also monitor 
costs they impose on other entities. 
In meeting its mission to: “support the development of Estonia [by audits] aimed at 
solving and preventing serious problems in society”, the Estonian SAI notes “the work 
of the National Audit Office is aimed at the general public, Riigikogu [Parliament], 
                                                 
17  Scott (2003) notes that Australia does not measure such savings, due to concerns about the calculation 
methodology. However, Azuma (2004, p. 72) provides evidence that the ANAO reported the “ratio 
of financial benefits from performance audit products, including savings, compared to the full cost of 
outputs” as 10:1 in the financial year ended 2002, and that the United States’ GAO also reports 
“profits and savings achieved thanks to the GAO’s findings and recommendations” (p.95). 
Nevertheless, Talbot and Wiggan (2010) note that the NAO is unusual in valuing benefits in dollar 
terms. (See also Chapter 3.) (The US ability to litigate against fraud and waste may also help in 
quantifying audit impact there – Moor and Gates, 1987).  
18  Dunleavy et al. (2009) notes that as part of its legitimacy for performance audits, the NAO is 
expected to achieve savings of at least 9 times greater than its costs.  
19  Annual Report 2014, Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of Bangladesh. Downloaded 
from http://www.cagbd.org/publication/AnnualReport2014.pdf 




central government and local authorities”.21 Thus, the Estonian SAI further notes its 
desire to report to “people in their own language, and not in the language of officials, 
what the state is doing with their money and whether or not people are getting what has 
been promised to them for their money”.21 This confirms the comment by Gendron et 
al. (2001), that the public remains concerned about a lack of probity and 
mismanagement, such as SAIs highlight in ‘regular’ audit reports, showing the public 
values SAIs’ accountability role. 
In respect of independently and objectively supporting reform, Estonia organises 
seminars and other activities to support its work in the public sector, further cementing 
its reputation. In addition, New Zealand notes the challenges the public sector faces in 
moving to new financial reporting standards, and the assistance it provides.22 
Persuasiveness is seen to be important to bring about change within the public sector 
(Hungary), but there is a need to maintain independence (Australia) (as also noted by 
Noussi, 2012). Assisting the public sector with benchmarking is a tactic used by many 
(e.g. Hungary, New Zealand, UK).  
As noted in the literature review, international collaboration is also an important part of 
independently and objectively supporting reform as public value. This factor is 
highlighted by almost every SAI; including training, conferences, utilising international 
standards and peer audits in order to (as the Australians note): “apply insights from 
other jurisdictions … and lead and influence technical excellence in public sector 
audit”.23 Further, the UK’s SAI states: “We are the appointed external auditor of several 
multilateral international organisations and provide technical and managerial advice to 
a wide range of Supreme Audit Institutions and public accounts committees … 
contributing to the development of international standards in public sector audit and 
accountancy”.24 
                                                 
21  Strategy 2014-2020, Estonia National Audit Office (Riigikontroll). Downloaded from: 
http://www.riigikontroll.ee/Riigikontrollkuiasutus/Strateegia/tabid/140/language/en-
US/Default.aspx. 
22  Annual Plan 2015/16. Controller and Auditor General New Zealand. Downloaded from: 
http://www.oag.govt.nz/2015/annual-plan. 
23 ANAO 2015-19 Corporate Plan, Australian National Audit Office. Downloaded from: 
http://www.anao.gov.au/About-Us/~/media/Uploads/Corporate%20Publications/ANAO-Corporate-
Plan.pdf 




4.2. Legitimacy and Support 
SAIs need support and legitimacy, to meet the public value strategy to strengthen (or 
attain) accountability and transparency in public financial management (e.g. Australia, 
Bangladesh, Canada, Poland, Turkey, UK). All note their need for independence. For 
some, the annual report was a place to call for further resources, the need to have control 
of those resources (e.g. Ireland, Jamaica), note work challenges arising from 
governmental changes (e.g. Australia, UK), and fiscal challenges due to non-payment 
of debts (South Africa). 
Many SAIs publish a budget in their call for support.25 Accordingly, financial 
sustainability is one measure of support, with the South Africa SAI measuring its net 
surplus over time, as well as debtors’ and creditors’ days.26 To ensure legitimacy, SAIs 
aim for a clean audit report (e.g. Hungary, South Africa) and a number of SAIs have 
had peer reviews (e.g. Bangladesh, Canada, Poland), with Australia discussing the 
operation of its Audit Committee. In addition, Dankó (2014) notes that the 
independence of the State Audit Office of Hungary has been strengthened by a new 
Fundamental Law. The Turkish SAI notes: “having a reputation of being an objective 
and credible entity” is important.27 
Core to legitimacy and support is building trust (INTOSAI, 2013; Moore, 2013). To 
ensure that its audits are of high quality, Jamaica’s SAI obtains views of key 
stakeholders from focus groups during the planning and fieldwork stage of all 
performance audits.20 This is similar to the approach of Poland’s SAI which, during 
2012, convened 18 panels of experts to provide advice during and after audits (but 
before the audit report was published).28 Australia’s SAI convenes a special (internal) 
committee when issues are contentious, to ensure that all matters are appropriately 
                                                 
25  The OECD (2014) report on Chile notes that the lack of financial autonomy is a danger threatening 
independence. The INTOSAI IDI report (2014) notes that, while 55% of SAIs are able to appeal their 
budget allocations to the legislature, 40% report that the executive interferes in the budget process.  




27  2014 Accountability Report, Turkish Court of Audit. Downloaded from: 
http://www.sayistay.gov.tr/En/Upload/files/2014_Accountability%20Report.pdf. 




considered (McPhee, 2012), while New Zealand’s SAI obtains an independent review 
of its auditor appointments and fee monitoring processes.29 
In terms of a further indication of trust, the Bangladesh SAI notes that Transparency 
International Bangladesh’s National Integrity System report showed they are “a better 
performer than any other watchdog institutions … acts as a major deterrent against 
inefficiency and corrupt use of money and … delivering on its constitutional 
obligations…” (p.5).19  
4.3. Operating Capacity 
The development and deployment of operating capacity should enable SAIs to deliver 
public value (Moore, 2013). Commonly, SAIs report they seek to ensure their audit 
work is of high quality, that staff are professionally trained and that they practice good 
internal governance (e.g. Bangladesh, Canada, South Africa, UK). Australia recognises 
the way that value can be compromised if the SAI fails to influence, and fails to conduct 
high quality audits, to monitor and analyse change.23 The Turkish SAI lists its IT 
capability (e.g. number of laptops, PCs and so on), presumably to make the point that 
they have such capacity,27 while the US’ GAO undertakes an internal survey to measure 
its effectiveness.15 
Pollitt and Summa (1997, p. 325) note that the French SAI (the Cour des Comptes) 
emphasises the “high qualifications and extraordinary status of its audit staff” who are 
magistrates with post-graduate qualifications.30 Further, the UK’s NAO highlights 
staff’s continuous training, and thus the functionality of their work (Pollitt & Summa, 
1997). In Canada, Alberta’s Auditor-General accentuates the number of senior staff 
serving on government task forces, which is seen as an expression of confidence in the 
Office (Gendron et al., 2001). Australia’s SAI measures leadership capacity, 
contemporary communication capacity, advanced information analytics capacity, and 
success of new models of audit delivery.23 
Azuma (2004) recommends publication of corporate documents to report value. The 
extent of reporting will depend on the SAI’s structure (INTOSAI IDI Development 
                                                 
29  Audit Report 2014/15, Controller and Auditor General New Zealand. Downloaded from: 
http://www.oag.govt.nz/2015/annual-report 
30  Nevertheless, the fact that they are judges, means that audit processes can be quite different from 
those in SAIs modelled along Westminster or Collegiate/Board lines (Morin, 2011).  
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Initiative, 2014), with Poland’s SAI being obliged to report only to the Sejm of the 
Republic of Poland (the lower house of Parliament).28 Further, the Swiss SAI has not 
reported publicly in the past, but its reports are increasingly being made available under 
the Freedom of Information Act and, from 2015, it plans to be even more transparent.31 
Their Auditor General notes that the unintended consequences of more widely-
available reports is a loss of confidence in government, especially when matters for 
improvement are highlighted. 
Through the strategic plans, annual plans, budgets and annual reports published by SAIs 
we observe objectives (outcomes), management performance indicators and targets, 
linkages of outputs to outcomes (and intermediate outcomes), and how SAIs measured 
these.32 In this research, of the 16 countries found to have reports, 12 published a 
Strategic Plan covering the year 2015 (of which two were out of date) – these can be a 
key means to consult with relevant stakeholders. All SAIs published an Annual Report, 
but only five published a recent Annual/Corporate Plan to show where audit effort 
would be applied. Of the Annual Reports, seven included the SAI’s financial statements 
(all of which were audited). The other annual reports included only summaries of 
activities (in the case of Ireland, only the financial statements were published in the 
annual report, with no other information).  
Further measures of leading by example are provided by Gendron et al. (2001) who 
analysed how the Auditor General of Alberta highlights the speed with which it 
completes its annual report,33 how many of its recommendations are accepted by 
government, the costs of audits and number of recommendations in each. From the 
Netherlands, Lonsdale (2000) notes the SAI monitors and reports whether their work 
has been mentioned in the Budget Bill, whether its auditors are invited to present a 
                                                 
31  2014 Annual Report, Swiss Federal Audit Office. Downloaded from: 
http://www.efk.admin.ch/images/stories/efk_dokumente/publikationen/jahresberichte/2014/CDF_ac
t_2014_en_PDF.pdf. 
32  In Australia and Canada cases the outcomes sought are similar: to improve the administrative 
management of the federal government; and to ensure the accountability of the federal government, 
while New Zealand’s were: to maintain the integrity of financial and non-financial performance 
reports, to promote the better use of public resources and to make lawful payments from public funds. 
The United States’ GAO’s strategic goals included accountability of federal government, but also 
sought to enable government to respond to challenges of global interdependence and those associated 
with the well-being and financial security of Americans (Azuma, 2004). 
33  In 2009 the Open Budget Survey noted that only 15 SAIs released their annual report within six 
months (Ramkumar, 2009) and in 2015, when the IBP (2015) reduced the time from 24 months to 
12, fewer SAIs reached that benchmark (66 instead of 68). Nevertheless, the OECD (2000, p. 64) 
notes “the majority of OECD countries publish the external audit reports routinely”. 
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report to a Standing Committee, and whether Members of Parliament (MPs) press 
ministries to take the recommended actions. 
Reporting on costs and activity is evident in Pollitt and Summa’s (1997) study of the 
UK, Swedish and Finnish SAI’s reports. Further, Pollitt and Summa (1997, p. 317) note 
that the UK’s NAO not only reports that its costs per audit have decreased,34 but that it 
also “undertakes internal quality reviews of its work using independent quality panels 
and surveys of audited bodies to seek their opinions of the usefulness of NAO activity”.  
Being responsive and communicating effectively is another measure of operating 
capacity. An example is provided by Canada’s SAI, which has a strategic objective to 
ensure that users and managers find audit reports understandable, fair and add value.  
In addition, Norway’s SAI notes “auditing shall have great social relevance and topical 
merit”35 and, for Ireland, “support effective democracy”.36 Yet, the Turkish SAI notes 
as a weakness: “unsatisfactory relationships with external stakeholders and media”.27 
Thus, Hungary makes use of “citizens’ indications, complaints and the issues, topics 
relevant to the National Assembly and the general public” in organising its work 
(Dankó, 2014).  
To show their relevance to citizens, some SAIs report the number of press releases, 
others’ publications that include their work and/or visits to their website (e.g. Iceland, 
Poland). Jamaica’s SAI also logs correspondence sent and Parliamentary discussions, 
with South Africa logging a rather general number of “stakeholder engagements”. 
Further, the Effective Institutions Platform (2014) provides an example of Chile’s 
SAI’s web portal that counts the number of complaints and suggestions by citizens, 
how they have been dealt with, the length of time to respond, and the status of any audit 
actions occurring as a consequence. 
These examples from different SAIs’ reports are summarised in Table 3 which further 
extends Table 1. 
                                                 
34  This may not be a good thing of course, especially if it impairs the achievement of objectives.  
35  Strategy 2014-2018, Auditor General of Norway. Downloaded from: 
https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/en/AboutRR/Publications/StrategicPlan/Pages/Strategicplan.aspx.  
36  Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General –Statement of Strategy 2012-2014. Ireland. 
Downloaded from: http://www.audgen.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=1352. 
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Table 3: Measurements of value by SAIs in this study 
Moore’s 
strategy 
ISSAI principle/s and 
description 
Positive Impact measured by: 
1. Public Value 
Ensuring public sector 
accountability 
(1) Strategic plans to ensure public sector accountability;  
(2) Dollar value of funds saved due to audits; 
(3) Developing networking relationships with other agencies;  




(1) Number of completed audits and timeliness, number of unqualified reports issued;  
(2) Reporting that quality of underlying reports have improved. Benchmarking services to public sector; 
(3) Number of reports tabled with Parliament (or appropriate body), recommendations made to improve efficiency 
and effectiveness;  
(4) Feedback from auditees; 
(5) Better practice guides, contribute to Bills; 




All assert they are independent and have appropriate legislative authority, but call for more resources, and as being 
stretched. 
Building trust 
(1) Peer reviews, Audit Committee, Report on Integrity;  
(2) For performance reports, using focus groups, Panel of Experts;  




Lead by example 
(1) Reports include annual reports (16), annual plan (5) & strategic plans (12);  
(2) Budgets published;  
(3) Clean audit reports on SAI’s annual report are published;  
(4) Quality of staff;  
(5) Quality of governance;  




(1) Strategic objective to ensure that users and managers find audit reports understandable to support democracy; 
(2) Recognise the digital era and drive to transform services; 
(3) Citizens’ complaints directs work; 
(4) Count press releases, website visits, correspondence. 
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5. Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper has argued (along with Raudla et al., 2015) that it is important for SAIs to 
report on the public value they deliver. We have used Moore’s (2013) concept of public 
value to develop a framework of public value for SAIs and also utilised a number of 
SAIs’ reports to observe how they report on their public value. Key to Moore’s (2013) 
concept is that public value is defined as a collective, rather than individual measure, 
and thus requires more than one measure if it is to meet different stakeholders’ needs. 
Further, Moore (2013, p. 104) notes: “…public value is conditional on the support of 
the political authorizing environment that has the right and responsibility to define 
public value ....”. This reminds us that it is necessary to manage, measure and report 
public value, along with an SAI’s legitimacy and support and operational capacity. 
These three strategic points are shown in Figure 1, and are discussed further in this 
section.  
Figure 1: Graph of total scores on Public Value 
 
Note: percentage scores represent the number of items out of those in Table 3 under each heading 































5.1 Public value in SAI reporting 
The strategic triangle points to the ability to deliver public value. This ability is two-
fold: ensuring public sector accountability and independently and objectively 
supporting public sector reform.  
As can be seen in Figure 1, many SAIs have a strategic plan to ensure public sector 
accountability, which assists them in managing public sector risk.37 As noted by Noussi 
(2012) and Pallot (2003), SAIs are expected to deliver a wider, constitutional 
accountability. This requires the SAI to report on whether agencies in the public sector 
(and government itself) have exercised probity and legality in their collection and 
spending of citizens’ (taxpayers’) dollars (Friedberg & Lutrin, 2005). In addition, the 
UK and US emphasise the public benefits that they deliver by providing the dollar value 
of funds saved through audits; further, a number of SAIs report on how many 
recommendations they make. Yet, our research shows that few SAIs explicitly discuss 
value, and of those that do, not all produce annual reports, and fewer publish annual 
and strategic plans.  
In addition, although Parliament must be technically capable to manage the information 
for accountability (Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2015; Santiso, 2015), none of the 
SAIs in this research reported publicly on how they assist Parliamentary bodies to 
improve their technical capacity in order to carry out their oversight roles. One 
explanation for this might be because, under the insurance hypothesis for audit (Hay et 
al., 2016), Parliament may wish the auditor to act as a scapegoat for an entity’s 
management’s failures and it suits the Public Accounts Committee not to shoulder the 
blame for such failures; although the omission might simply be because the SAIs were 
not asked to provide this service.  
Many SAIs also recognise the second major public value they can bring, by 
independently and objectively supporting reform (Blume & Voigt, 2011). By (i) listing 
the number of audits undertaken, timeliness and lack of qualifications in these audits, 
they provide support for the agency theory reasons for audit and (ii) by showing that 
                                                 
37  Out of the 10 possible items they could have reported as part of their strategic plans to deliver these 
public values (see table 3), the UK scored 80%, New Zealand, 70% and at 60% was Australia, the 
US and Canada. Estonia and South Africa scored 50%. 
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public sector managers are reporting well to boards/governors, ministers, and the 
public, they confirm a monitoring role. Indeed, by reporting that the quality of this 
reporting has improved and by benchmarking outputs and outcomes, SAIs signal the 
quality of management. However, while most SAIs in this research listed/counted the 
number of audit reports they produced, fewer linked measures of outputs to the 
outcomes they aimed for. Some listed the benchmarking services they had developed 
and how accounting had improved, but such information was sparse.  
The quality of the SAIs is also shown by feedback from auditees which we found a 
number of SAIs reporting. Yet, SAIs are reticent to critique policy (Barzelay, 1997; 
Czasche-Meseke, 1995; Gendron et al., 2001; Grasso & Sharkansky, 2001; Jantz et al., 
2015) and to realise the public benefits that Schelker and Eichenberger (2010) argue 
for. This suggests that SAIs should do more to report their outcomes and the outputs 
they deliver to achieve public values.  
In respect of the manner in which audit can lead to organisational control, SAIs do not 
report on how they have undertaken internal audits (if any) or encouraged audit 
committees/good governance. However, organisational control is evident through 
SAIs’ performance audits and reporting on auditees’ acceptance of recommendations 
to improve efficiency and effectiveness (“independently and objectively supporting 
reform”). Yet, this measure fails to take into account negative consequences of the audit 
process (Leeuw, 2011), such as costs, or the manner in which requiring strict adherence 
to rules can reduce organisational learning. Nevertheless, most reported a range of 
outputs, (including education activities undertaken), however few acknowledged the 
fact that not all changes could be attributed to the SAI, but were as a result of 
collaborative and others’ efforts. Attestation of these achievements is a challenge, but 
SAIs should lead the way in showing the public sector how to do this.  
In supporting reform, SAIs also report on their influence internationally and the 
overseas examples that they have adopted. These recognise the positive (possible) 
externalities of SAIs, but the extent to which stakeholders are interested in this, is 
unknown. It is likely that the international experience will feed into an SAI’s deliver of 
public benefit.  
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The confirmation hypothesis notes the value of ex post audit in providing assurance to 
stakeholders about ex ante and other unaudited information (Hay et al., 2016). While 
independence is essential for this, no SAIs were observed to make a specific subsequent 
report on unaudited results from public sector agencies and we do not therefore have 
evidence of the importance of audit in giving credence to these unaudited results. 
However, these reports could be subsumed in routine audit reports. The public value of 
subsequent confirmation of unaudited announcements is worthy of further research. 
5.2 Arbiters of public value 
SAIs are unable to support reform if they do not maintain legitimacy and support. 
Independence is the prime means through which they do this – through the freedom 
SAIs have to make enquiries, call public entities to account, report, encourage change, 
and appoint staff (Grasso & Sharkansky, 2001; Norton & Smith, 2008; Schelker, 2008). 
Yet a number of SAIs in this study commented on budget constraints and being 
stretched due to extra work. Unless an appropriate level of resources is committed to 
these SAIs, they will be unable to undertake their core work at a high-enough quality 
to deliver public value.38  
External reports of SAIs’ legitimacy is rare, but peer reviews are one option to show 
external stakeholders that an SAI has legitimacy. SAIs reported on internal checks and 
balances for their performance audits and how they had utilised focus groups, panels of 
experts, and so on. Yet, New Zealand is the only SAI in our sample that reported having 
its own audit committee. New Zealand also obtains an independent review of its audit 
outsourcing. Such activities also signal audit quality.  
As noted, Moore (2013) highlights the need for operating capacity. This is reflected in 
high quality audit work, high quality staff, and reporting (Azuma, 2004; Gendron et al., 
2001; Talbot & Wiggan, 2010). Not all SAIs in this research published their financial 
data openly, although those that did, included audit reports.39 This aspect of operational 
capacity underpins public value (by signalling quality, but also through robustness of 
audit) and builds legitimacy. 
                                                 
38  This item was scored out of a possible 4 (see table 3 for items) and Poland and New Zealand scored 
3/4 (75%). Australia, Bangladesh, Canada and Jamaica scored 50%.  
39  This item was scored out of a possible 12 (see table 3 for items). New Zealand scored 83% and 
Canada 75% with Australia and South Africa scoring 67%. Jamaica and the UK scored 58% and 
Iceland, Turkey and the US scored 50%. 
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Public value cannot be delivered without each of Moore’s (2013) three strategic points 
and learning at each point to create public value. He further notes that different 
stakeholders will impact these strategic points with different intensities. While all 
citizens will contribute to an SAI’s legitimacy and support (through trust in the system 
and through funding), they are unlikely to contribute directly to its operational capacity. 
Citizens and voters are most likely to act as arbiters of public value through their voice 
and votes. Parliament also contributes to an SAI’s legitimacy and support, as well as its 
operational capacity (through funding). Co-producers of the SAI (for example where 
audits have been outsourced, but also contributors such as professional staff etc.) also 
contribute to its operating capacity, and auditees (as clients) also having a moderately 
strong contribution. Thus, SAIs must analyse the public value they deliver from the 
point of view of these stakeholders.  
While engagement with key stakeholders is important, our study shows that not all SAIs 
prioritise this (for example, Ireland’s SAI posted only one press release per 12-month 
period on its website). With the increase in performance audits, a number of the SAIs 
in this research have mechanisms through which citizens can make complaints and/or 
suggest items for SAI enquiries (as also seen in IBS, 2015; Ramkumar, 2009). Moore 
(2013) argues that when public sector entities (like SAIs) attend to the public value that 
citizens, voters and taxpayers want, they will also be encouraged to engage the public 
through broader programmes, in co-producing outcomes. Therefore, research which 
analyses SAIs’ two-way communication would show how the public engages with SIAs 
worldwide.  
Table 1 highlighted that SAI activity may also have negative impacts, however only 
one SAI – the Swiss – mentioned a negative impact, namely that widely available 
reports may lead to a loss of confidence in government. Further, while few SAIs publish 
the challenges they meet in delivering public value, there is no doubt that these exist. 
Those that do, report the struggle for resources in order to hold the public sector 
accountable and to independently and objectively support reform. There is room for 
wider reporting and further research on other measures used in other reports, especially 
as one of the limitations of this research is the limited range of documents analysed and 
the number of SAIs in the final sample.  
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As ‘watchdogs of public value’ (Moore & Gates, 1987), SAIs have a responsibility to 
deliver and report on the public value they deliver. In undertaking empirical research 
to fill a gap in the literature (Bryson et al., 2016; Hartley et al., 2016), this research 
provides numerous examples of the ways SAIs report about the way in which they seek 
to increase efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector. Although de Jong et al. (de 
Jong et al., 2016) suggest questions about public value are rarely asked, it is evident 
that SAIs do report on their role in discharging such value. However, there is no 
evidence to suggest that SAIs are able to use their independence to critique and build 
fairness and justice in society as a deontological perception of value (Moore, 2013). 
Crosby et al. (2016) suggest that innovation and collaboration are necessary; further the 
question must be asked as to whether SAIs have a role in this value creation. Certainly 
performance audits of government services may be one aspect that could be reported 
on, but the lack of desire to enter policy debates (Barzelay, 1997; Gendron et al., 2001; 
Grasso & Sharkansky, 2001; Jantz et al., 2015) is a disincentive that SAIs must 
overcome if they are to play a role in achieving a good and just society and enrol the 
public as an arbiter of value as argued for by Geuijen et al. (2016). In conclusion, the 
recognition of the need to be democratically accountable for efficiency and 
effectiveness is one aspect of the public value of SAIs. SAIs’ reporting prioritises 
critiques to increase public sector efficiency and effectiveness, rather than government 
policy, and generally fail to discuss any negative consequences of their work. SAIs are 
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